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Dieterich: Criminal Law: Limitation of Prosecution - Time

COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: LIMITATION OF
PROSECUTION-- -TIME
Limitation of criminal prosecution to a specified period
of time after the commission or discovery of a crime is not, according to most commentators, a part of the common law.'
The principle of setting a time limit for such prosecutions has
been widely accepted, however, and Wyoming and South Carolina have long been the only states without criminal statutes
of limitation.2 The purpose of this Comment is to consider
the origins and objectives of such statutes, their treatment by
the courts, illustrative provisions of current statutes-both
state and federal, their possible disadvantages as well as advantages, and constitutional considerations which may be involved. Information on these points should aid in a determination of whether or not it would be advisable for Wyoming to
enact a criminal statute of limitations.
In 1803 Lord Ellenborough made the statement that there
was no limitation at common law to a criminal prosecution by
indictment.' Blackstone's editors enlarged upon this by commenting that the crown was not precluded from preferring
an indictment at any distance of time from the actual perpetration of the offense, unless some particular statute limited
the time of prosecuting; and there was no general statute of
Statutes
limitations applicable to criminal proceedings.'
including
enacted in the first half of the sixteenth century,'
one setting a thirty-day limitation period for prosecution
of treasons committed by spoken words,' are said to have
abolished the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi (no lapse of
time bars the king) in the cases to which they applied.' Other
limitation statutes applicable to particular offenses have
1.

WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 316, at 209 (8th ed. 1880);
BISHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES § 257 (3d ed. 1901); People v. Bailey, 103 Misc.
366, 171 N.Y. Supp. 394, 395 (Sup. Ct. 1918). Contra, DANGEL, CRIMINAL

LAW § 107 (1951).
2.

1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 179, at 417 n. 8 (Anderson ed.

1957).
3. Dover v. Maester, 5 Esp. 92, 93 (1803).
4.

4 BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES

301 n. (Christian, Chitty, Lee, Hovenden

& Ryland ed. 1870).
5. 7 Henry 8, c. 3; 31 Eliz. 1, 3. 5.
6. 1 Edward 6, c. 12 § 19.
7. 4 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLIISH LAW 525 (1924).
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since been passed in England, many of them during the twentieth century.'
Criminal statutes of limitation have found even greater
acceptance in this country than in England, as shown by their
enactment by Congress and forty-eight of the state legislatures, and by their applicability to a broad range of criminal
offenses.' Most of these statutes have been in effect for many
years, and there has been no discernible general trend toward
repealing them, extending the limitation periods they set,
or limiting their application.
It appears that these statutes serve society's interest in
the efficient administration of criminal law and in adjudications of guilt that are more likely to be just if based on relatively fresh and therefore reliable evidence. Such statutes
encourage law enforcement agencies to concentrate on recent
crimes, which offer a greater threat to society than those committed in the distant past. It seems self-evident that if a
person committed a crime for which he can no longer be prosecuted because of a limitation statute, either he represents no
further threat to society because he has committed no further
crimes, or the threat he represents will be met by prosecution
for his recent crimes.
It has been stated that the most important reason for
statutes of limitation for criminal prosecutions is to protect
the individual accused from the burden of defending himself
against charges of long-completed misconduct.'
This burden
becomes heavier with the passage of time, as witnesses cannot
be traced and evidence needed for a defense is lost or destroyed. When these same difficulties face a prosecutor, he
may elect not to proceed; but a defendant has no such choice
and may be at an unfair disadvantage in rebutting the prosecution's proof.
Lack of a limitation statute will cause further unfairness
if a prosecutor chooses to file a complaint on one count and
withhold other charges on which he has sufficient evidence to
8. See 10 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 341 (3d. ed. 1955), for examples of
these statutes.
9. See accompanying table.
10. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Bar to
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. Rsw. 630 (1954), quoted in Commonwealth v.
Howard, 210 Pa. Super. 284, 232 A.2d 207, 210 (1967).
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file. After trial and conviction on the first charge, such a
prosecutor is in a position to prevent the defendant from appealing his conviction or from availing himself of some other
right that is his by threatening the filing of the complaint or
complaints which have been withheld. A statute limiting the
period within which prosecution may be initiated would prevent such a tactic-a tactic which seems to raise a constitutional due process question by constituting a denial of11 "natural, inherent, fundamental principles of fairness."
Criminal limitation statutes also play a part in providing
the constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial.'
Alone they cannot assure the right, as they provide only for
the commencement of prosecution within a stated time and do
not control the time of trial; but applied in conjunction with
the usual type of statute limiting the time for trial after prosecution has been initiated, 8 the criminal limitation statute
should aid in achieving the desired constitutional result.
To the extent that the administration of the criminal
law is intended to rehabilitate the criminal, the limitation
statutes appear to serve a public purpose as well as a private
one by encouraging self-rehabilitation. The statutes will relieve the man who has made one undiscovered criminal error
of the fear that his efforts at self-rehabilitation over a period
of many years may be destroyed by prosecution for the crime
committed so far in the past.
An arguable disadvantage of the criminal limitation
statutes is that they may, in cases where they apply, prevent
accomplishment of the atavistic retaliatory purposes of the
criminal laws; but it is hard to believe that they present an
added danger to society, for it seems unlikely that an habitual
criminal will wait for the statute to run on one crime before
committing another.
Although the legal writers have shown little interest in
the criminal limitation statutes and their legislative history
is scanty, the courts have not neglected to comment upon them.
A plea of the statute has been universally classed as a plea in
11. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1941); WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1681 (2d ed. 1929).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WYo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10.
13. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-234 and -235 (1957).
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bar and not in abatement1 4 and one that raises a question going
to the merits of the defendant's claim of right to an acquittal
or discharge, 5 although not to the question of his guilt or innocence.1" It has been held that prosecution within the statutory period is an essential element of an offense, and that the
bar of the statute of limitations goes to the jurisdiction rather
than merely to the remedy. 7
It was long ago said, and much repeated since, that a
criminal statute of limitations is a matter of legislative grace,
not right ;"5 but it has also been said and often repeated that
protection under the statute is a substantive right, not a mere
procedural one.19 A state court recently held that these statutes are fundamental to our society and to the criminal process and that they impose a limitation upon the power of the
sovereign, not a mere limitation upon a remedy as in a civil
20
case.
There seems to be no question as to the validity of the
criminal limitation statutes, for they have often been held
constitutional even where the limitation period had been extended by the legislature after the commission of a particular
crime.2" In Commonwealth v. Duffy, 22 the court characterized
the statutes as measures of public policy only and entirely
subject to the will of the legislature, which might change or
repeal them altogether, 2' and held that where the right to
acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by completion of
the period of limitation, that period is subject to enlargement
or repeal without violating the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. These statutes have been held subject to the rule of liberal construction in favor of the defendant,24 like other criminal statutes.
Reference to the accompanying table will show that current state statutes have two types of provisions setting limi14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 88 (1916); United States v.
Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78 (1910).
United States v. Barber, supra note 14, at 78.
WHARTON supra, note 2, § 179, at 418.
People v. Doctor, 64 Cal. 608 (Ct. App. 1967).
Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 514, 32 Am. Rep. 577 (1881).
United States v. Mathues, 27 F.2d 137 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
Cunningham v. District Court of Tulsa County, 432 P.2d 992, 997 (Ct.
Crim. App. Okla. 1967).
See, e.g., United States v. Vidal, 155 F. Supp. 180 (D. P.R. 1957).
Commonwealth v. Duffy, supra note 18, at 514.
No state has repealed its criminal limitation statute.
United States v. Udell, 109 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D. Del. 1952).
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tation periods for prosecution of criminal offenses: those
which apply to particular offenses, and those which apply to
"other felonies," "felonies,"
"misdemeanors," "felonies
punishable by hard labor" etc., without naming the specific
offense. Murder and capital crimes are the categories most
often excepted from any period of statutory limitation of
prosecution, along with arson, forgery and treason. The most
common limitation period for felonies (or for "other felonies"
where certain specific felonies are excepted from the operation of the limitation statute) is three years after the commission of the offense; the length of the limitation period for
prosecution of felonies ranges from two to six years.
Limitation periods for the prosecution of misdemeanors
range from one to six years, with fourteen states setting a period of one year and fourteen others a period of two years;
only one state statute prescribes a period longer than three
years. Crimes involving public officials, such as bribery,
falsification of public records and embezzlement of public
funds, are often made subject to 'prosecution for an exceptionally long time after their commission or discovery; some
of the statutes except prosecution for these crimes from any
time limitation at all. The longest limitation period provided
in the statutes is ten years, this period being applicable to
capital crimes and first-degree felonies in New Mexico, kidnapping and extortion in Michigan, and treason in Vermont.
Nearly all of the states have provided that the time during which the accused is absent from the state or is in the
state under an assumed name or under concealment as a fugitive from justice does not count toward the limitation period.
Thus as long as any of these circumstances continued, the statute could never run in favor of the accused.
Agreeing with forty-eight of the state legislatures on the
desirability of setting a time limit for criminal prosecutions,
the United States Congress has also enacted a limitation statute. Title 18 of the United States Code excepts capital offenses from any limitation period" but provides a five-year
period for all other offenses,2 6 except one year for criminal
25.
26.

18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1964).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3282-83 (1964).
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contempt 27 and seduction on a United States vessel,28 and ten
years for violation of the naturalization" and passport
laws.80
This summary shows that most of the current statutes
relate the length of the limitation period to the seriousness
of the crime. In 1954 this approach was criticized as being
motivated by the desire for retribution rather than for an
effectuation of the proper aims of limitation statutes." That
critic also suggested that:
[1] egislators, in determining a particular limitation
for a particular crime, should base the statutory period for the crime primarily upon the length of time
during which the facts constituting the elements of
the crime can be accurately ascertained, bearing in
mind the time needed to discover and investigate the
crime as promptly as possible. 2
Perhaps the scientific investigations necessary to aid legislators in making their determinations upon the basis suggested have not been conducted. At any rate, the suggestion
has brought no apparent response from the legislatures nor
even from the writers in the legal periodicals.
The statement that criminal statutes of limitation "are
essential in a system of criminal law which is designed to
afford to individuals the utmost protection from unjust prosecution"" 3 seems to have as much validity today as it did in
1954. It may have gained even greater validity since 1954 as a
result of the many Supreme Court decisions aimed at protecting the rights of the individual in the context of the administration of the criminal law.84 If the interests of the individual
and of society as a whole are in conflict, they must always be
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

118 U.S.C. § 3285 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 8286 (1964).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1423-28 (1964).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1541-44 (1964).
Note, supra note 10, at 636.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 651.
E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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balanced against each other and care must be taken to assure
that protection of the one does not seriously threaten the
other. It does not appear that the individual interests sought
to be protected by criminal statutes of limitation are to any
significant degree in conflict with the interests of society.
The only possible conflict of interest would seem to be
a conflict with society's interest in retaliation for criminal
acts-for its own sake, and for its possible deterrent effect.
An interest in retaliation for its own sake should surely be
overbalanced by the concern for the individual which is central to our system of government. Even if the validity of the
controversial but widely-held deterrence theory of criminal
law is admitted arguendo, the criminal limitation statutes do
not appear to have decreased the deterrent power of the penal
statutes. If they had, surely there would have been a marked
trend toward repealing the limitation statutes or increasing
the limitation periods provided. There has been no such
trend; experience in the forty-eight states which have had
limitation statutes, in most cases for many years, has apparently convinced their legislatures that the statutes are
desirable and should be retained. In addition, if statutes of
limitation applicable to civil actions, where only money is
ordinarily involved, are readily accepted, limitation statutes
applicable to criminal proceedings, where a person's liberty
is at stake, should be at least equally acceptable.
Unfortunately there has been little discussion of these
statutes and the criteria to be applied in setting the limitation
periods, which would ideally provide for "the assurance of
a maximum degree of avilability and reliability of evidence
consonant with an adequate allowance of time for investigation and prosecution." 5 The current statutes are not the best
that could be drafted. Nevertheless, until further scientific
information about the factors affecting the availability and
reliability of evidence and the time needed for investigation
and prosecution becomes available, the statutes seem to be
serving a useful purpose in protecting the interests of society
and of the individual.
35. Note, supra note 10, at 651.
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It is therefore suggested that the legislature be encouraged to enact a criminal statute of limitations for the State of
Wyoming, with provisions similar to those adopted in the
majority of the states.8" Future attention should be given to
amending the law by changing the limitation periods as relevant scientific information becomes available.
MARY FRANCES DIETERICH
36. See accompanying table.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/11

8

Dieterich: Criminal Law: Limitation of Prosecution - Time

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 5 [1970], Iss. 1, Art. 11

APPENDIX A

JN33~I~z~3~LO

CI)a

MOM

NO1HNXU

u

LOcoC

0C

0

o

o

NOSYvid

0

00
0

SONHdYNI

0

0

0

0i

aggi
soj

AU2iMYidflOvit

SaONURJ
to

o

t

J10NOLSHI3ANOD

0

0
0

ILI3A

z

cc~

05

-(Hamo)'

C)

AMN0

0-

K~lOM

0t
00

E-4Y
KOM
rio

1~o~

0i0

.W

0

,
cdl a)

Cd

d

o
r-

Z

W WS

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss1/11

:2
10

Dieterich: Criminal Law: Limitation of Prosecution - Time

0

ce

0

'

C.o

.0

w1

10

10

0

0S

10)

0.H

i00d~.

D

0.

0O

o
0

~r

0
gs

124

4)

.2
) id

Q.. 0

LO

UDUaC)14U)

0 C3
q
04

0.0

0
03

IC

00
'd

41~~~~4
0

>Il

Cd

r_

>..

Cd

04

9

r.
m= 0

10

0

a)r00

r-]

;

0r

00-

c

0

4)0

ZO~~
-co
~

0

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

4

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 5 [1970], Iss. 1, Art. 11
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. V

APPENDIX B
Ala. Code tit. 15, §§ 219-26 (1958).
Alaska Stat. § 11.40.020 (1962).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-106 (Supp. May 1969).
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-1601 to -1605 (1964 Repl.).
Cal. Penal Code §§ 799-803.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-3 (1963).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-193 (1958).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 2901-03 (1953).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.05 (1944).
Ga. Code Ann. § 27-601 (1953).
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 707-1, -2 (1968).
Idaho Code Ann. §§ 19-401, -404, -405 (1948); §§ 19-402, -403 (Supp. 1969).
Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, §§ 3-5 to -8 (1964).
Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-301 to -305 (1956 Repl.).
Iowa Code Ann. §§ 752.1-.6 (1950).
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 62-501 to -505 (1964).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.090 (1962).
La. Crim. Proc. Code arts. 578-82 (West 1967).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 452 (1964).
Md. Code Ann. art. 57, §§ 11, 12 (1968 Repl.).
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 277, § 63 (1968).
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.964 (1954).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 628.26 (1947).
Miss. Code Ann. § 2437 (1957).
Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 541.190-.230 (1953).
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 94-5701 to -5706 (1947).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-110 (1964).
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.080-.100 (1967).
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 603:1 (Supp. 1969).
N .J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:159-1 to -4 (1953).
N. M1.Stat. Ann. § 40A-1-8 (1964 Repl.).
N. Y. Crim. Proc. Code §§ 141-44a (McKinney 1958).
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15-1 (1965 Repl.).
N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 29-04-01 to -05 (1960).
N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:159-1 to -4 (1953).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.18 (1964).
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 151-53 (Supp. 1967).
Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 131.110-30 (1967).
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 211-14 (1964).
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17 (1956).
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 23-8-1 to -6 (1967).
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-201 to -204 (1955).
Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. arts. 12.01-05 (1966).
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-9-1 to -6 (1953).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 4501-06 (1958).
Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.1-42, 19.1-8 (1950).
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9.79.110, 10.01.020 (1961).
W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-11-9 (1966).
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.74 (1958).
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